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NOTES
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD
There is no clause in the Constitution which explicitly supports a right to
travel abroad. Yet consistent with our common law heritage,' Americans have
exercised the right of international travel free of substantial restrictions for the
greater part of our history. Passports, which appeared in America as early as
1796,2 were not issued initially to restrict or control travel abroad, but were re-
garded as an informal privilege to facilitate foreign travel by identifying the
bearer as an American citizen.3 Today, the issuance of passports is governed by
the Passport Act of 1926, which provides that "[t]he Secretary of State may
grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate
and prescribe for and on the behalf of the United States .... "4 The construction
of the word "may" in this statute has been the focal point of much of the recent
passport litigation. A broad reading of the word is the basis for the State De-
partment's contention that it has absolute discretion in the issuing of passports.5
The question made scant difference to the right of Americans to travel, as long
as a passport remained a convenience, rather than a prerequisite, for foreign
travel. Freedom for foreign travel was in fact the general rule in this country
until well into the present century. Passports were required briefly during the
Civil War and World War I, but "[t]he exceptions that developed in war-time
merely emphasized the general rule."6 As late as 1929, some authorities felt that
the ten dollar passport fee was a wrongful interference with the right to travel.7
However, unfettered movement of American citizens abroad ended as a prac-
tical matter in 1941, when Congress extended the 1918 wartime passport require-
ment to include "national emergencies." 8 While the national emergency to which
1. The first formal recognition of a right to foreign travel at common law was ch. 42 of
the Magna Carta. The power of the King to prevent departures through the writ of Ne Exeat
Regno was at one time a potent weapon of the monarchy, but the writ fell into disuse, For
the common law background see Note, Passports and Freedom of Travel: The Conflict of a
Right and a Privilege, 41 Geo. L.J. 63, 64-70 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Passports and
Freedom of Travel]. In America, Ne Exeat Regno survived as an equitable writ against
absconding debtors. Parker, The Right to Go Abroad: To Have and to Hold a Passport, 40
Va. L. Rev. 853, 868 (1954).
2. 12 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 387, 392 (1973).
3. A passport "is a document, which, from its nature and object, is addressed to foreign
powers; purporting only to be a request, that the bearer of it may pass safely and freely;
and is ... a political document, by which the bearer is recognised, in foreign countries, as an
American citizen ...." Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 698 (1835).
4. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1970).
5. See Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D.D.C. 1952).
6. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 47, 60 (1956) [herein-
after cited as Boudin].
7. Id. at 47.
8. Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252, amending Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, 40
Stat. 559 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), (b) (1970)).
838
RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD
the 1941 legislation related was declared officially at an end on April 28, 1952, 0
Congress continued its provisions until June 1, 1952,10 and in the interim passed
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which repealed the 1941 law and
re-enacted it as § 215 of the new Act. 1 At this time a national emergency was
in effect, as proclaimed by the President in 1951 as a result of the Korean War,12
and, in 1953, President Truman's proclamation of need triggered the criminal
sanctions of the Act.'3 The requirement of a passport for exit from and re-entry
into14 the United States has been modified by the State Department, however,
to permit freedom of travel in the Western Hemisphere, with the exception of
Cuba.15
A passport thus became a license for foreign travel, rather than a convenience
to the traveler. Consequently, "a serious question arose as to the nature and ex-
tent of the ordinary freedom of an American citizen to leave the United States
and return as he pleased, and the nature and extent of the protection which the
law afforded him in the enjoyment of that freedom."' 0 The Secretary of State,
moreover, still claimed absolute discretion in issuing passports under the Pass-
port Act of 1926. Passport refusals to controversial figures on the vague basis
that their travel would not be in the "best interests of the United States" began
to receive widespread coverage by the press.'- As public attention was brought
to bear, so too the courts began to focus on the problem, and the concept of a
passport as a privilege began to give way to a judically constructed right to
travel.
In Bauer v. Acheson,'8 a three-judge district court rejected the State Depart-
ment's claim of absolute discretion in the issuance of passports. The plaintiff, an
American journalist working in Paris, had her passport revoked without hearing
or notice. The Secretary of State refused to renew or validate the passport except
to allow return to the United States, explaining that the plaintiff's activities
were not in the best interests of the United States.19 Plaintiff emphasized the
denial of a hearing rather than any deprivation of a right to travel, and the court
concluded that the revocation was without authority at law and ordered a hear-
ing.20 The court also expressed the novel view that a right to foreign travel existed
9. Proc. No. 2974, 66 Stat. C31 (1952), 3 C.F.R. 158 (1949-1953 Comp.).
10. Act of Apr. 14, 1952, ch. 204, § 40, 66 Stat. 54.
11. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 2, § 215, 66 Stat. 181 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), (b)
(1970)).
12. 3 C.F.R. 99 (1949-1953 Comp.).
13. Id. at 180.
14. In Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 394 (5th Cir. 1964), it was held that a
citizen could not constitutionally be convicted of re-entry into the United States without
a passport, for an absent citizen's right to return "is inherent in the concept of citizenship."
15. 22 C.F.R. § 53.2(b) (1973).
16. Passports and Freedom of Travel 64.
17. See I T. Emerson, D. Haber & N. Dorsen, Political and Civil Rights in the United
States 1274-76 (3d ed. 1967).
18. 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
19. Id. at 448.
20. Id. at 452-53.
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in the Constitution. Analogizing to Williams v. Fears,21 in which the Supreme
Court connected interstate travel to the "liberty" of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment,2 2 the Bauer court stated that "it is difficult to see
where, in principle, freedom to travel outside the United States is any less an
attribute of personal liberty. "23 However, the court cautioned that the right to
travel abroad was not an absolute liberty, but was subject to reasonable regula-
tion, over which the Secretary of State had "wide," though not absolute, discre-
tion.24
Judge Fahy, who sat on the Baiter panel,20 later commented that, in setting
aside the revocation of the plaintiff's passport unless a hearing was granted
within a reasonable time, "Baiter thus applied the standards of procedural due
process to the methods by which the federal government could restrict travel;
that is, the right to travel was held to be a liberty protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment from deprivation without a hearing. '20 Bauer did not lay passport refusals
to rest;27 rather, its "significance [was] its frank recognition of the ... conflict
between the right of international travel and the privilege of retaining a valid
passport.12
8
The conflict was resurrected three years later in Shachtman v. Dulles,29 when
the national chairman of the Independent Socialist League was refused a pass-
port solely because of the listing of his organization as subversive by the Attorney
General. 30 Judge Fahy, writing for the court of appeals, stated that the right to
travel was a "natural right,"3 1 which must be accorded due process protection.
Since a hearing of sorts had been granted prior to revocation, the issue was not
procedural, but rather substantive, due process, i.e., was the refusal arbitrary?8 2
The subversive listing was held insufficient of itself to justify denial of a pass-
port to travel to Europe: it was arbitrary.3 3 Judge Fahy later looked upon the
decision as extending to the right to travel "the protection of substantive due
process; that is, not only must the method of restraint be fair and appropriate
but the substantive content of executive criteria for travel control must not be
21. 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
22. "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty .... " Id. at 274.
23. 106 F. Supp. at 451 (footnote omitted).
24. Id. at 451-52.
25. Judge Fahy dissented on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 453 (Fahy, J., dissenting).
26. Fahy, The Right to Travel, 6 Natural L.F. 109, 115 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Fahy].
27. Passport refusals became even more topical after Bauer. Playwright Arthur Miller, for
example, was refused a passport in 1954 to attend the opening in Brussels of his play "The
Crucible." Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, at 197 (1956).
28. Passports and Freedom of Travel 85.
29. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
30. Id. at 943.
31. Id. at 941.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 943.
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unreasonable, and the question of reasonableness was to be considered in light
of the high character of the liberty sought to be restrained. 3 4
The Supreme Court did not review either case, since the Secretary of State
acquiesced and granted the parties their passports. But in 1958, the case of Rock-
well Kent and Dr. Walter Briehl, who were refused passports because they would
not submit affidavits to the Secretary of State that they were not members of
the Communist Party, was heard by the Supreme Court in Kcnt v. Dulles.5
The Court examined the extent of the authorization which Congress had
vested in the Secretary to curtail travel abroad. While this power was phrased
broadly in the Passport Act of 1926,30 apparently it had been exercised in only
two narrow areas-involving the questions of allegiance and citizenship on one
hand, and unlawful and illegal conduct on the other. 7 The Court hesitated to
find in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (which made a passport a
prerequisite for foreign travel 8 ) the intent to authorize passport refusals on
grounds other than these two.39 Therefore, the Court concluded that neither
statute delegated authority to the Secretary of State to withhold a passport be-
cause of a citizen's beliefs or associations 40
The case was thus decided on the statutory level. Even so, the ruminations of
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, on the "basic" role of free travel in our
scheme of values,41 lend support to the argument that the right to travel abroad
is a constitutional one. The Court's opinion at one point stated that "[the right
to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without
due process of law under the Fifth Amendment."-'
The underlying constitutional issues came to the surface in Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State.4 3 Appellants, ranking members of the Communist Party, had their
passports revoked under section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, which provided that a member of a Communist organization which has
registered or has been ordered to register, commits a crime by either applying for,
or attempting to use, a passport. In effect, the section provided a statutory basis,
absent in Kent, for the denial of passports because of political associations or
beliefs. The appellants attacked section 6 as an unconstitutional deprivation of
their liberty under the due process clause of the fifth amendment on its face
and as applied to them.4
The Court assumed the existence of the right to travel abroad on the basis of
34. Fahy 115.
35. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
36. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1970) ; see text accompanying note 4 supra.
37. 357 U.S. at 127.
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1970).
39. 357 U.S. at 128.
40. Id. at 129-30.
41. Id. at 126 (dictum).
42. Id. at 125 (dictum).
43. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
44. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 6, 64 Stat. 987.
45. 378 U.S. at 505.
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Kent,46 and found section 6 "unconstitutional on its face" in that it "sweeps too
widely and too indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amend-
ment."4 7 The Court objected to the creation of an "irrebuttable presumption"
that members of the specified organizations would engage in activity threatening
to the national security of the United States while abroad. 48 In addition, the
section failed to consider the "security-sensitivity" of the area to which travel
was sought,49 and whether or not the individual was a knowing member of the
suspect organization.5°
The plurality opinion, 51 written by Justice Goldberg, has been subjected to
two conflicting interpretations. The point of contention is whether Aptheker is a
first or fifth amendment decision. "The first interpretation is that the right to
travel is a Fifth Amendment right which, because it is closely linked to First
Amendment rights, must be given something like a preferred status and stringent
protection. ' 2 The prime support for this interpretation is the opinion itself, since
Justice Goldberg referred to travel as a fifth amendment right. 3 However, the
conclusion that the restriction was a violation of due process was reached by
combining first and fifth amendment standards, the Court relying on first amend-
ment decisions 4 to provide a standard of reviewing the restriction on its face.",
This interpretation would mean that "some members of the Court have adopted
the view that the right to travel, being a personal rather than [a] property right,
is entitled to protection under the fifth amendment commensurate with the pro-
tection afforded rights of expression and association under the first amend-
ment. ' 6 This would establish a standard of protection under the fifth amend-
ment for the right to travel abroad beyond the rule of reasonableness normally
required by substantive due process.
7
46. Id. at 505-06. The dissent also accepted the existence of a constitutional right to travel
abroad. Id. at 525 (dissenting opinion).
47. Id. at 514 (opinion of the Court).
48. Id. at 511-12.
49. Id. at 512.
50. Id. at 510.
51. Justice Black, 378 U.S. at 517, and Justice Douglas, 378 U.S. at 519, concurred sep-
arately. Three Justices dissented. 378 U.S. at 521.
52. L. Turner, The Right to Travel and the Problem of Unenumerated Constitutional
Rights 182 (1972) (unpublished dissertation in the University of California at Los Angeles
Library, on file with Fordham L. Rev.) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
53. 378 U.S. at 505, 508, 514. See id. at 523 (dissenting opinion).
54. Id. at 516-17. Justice Goldberg relied on NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963),
and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
55. Challenges to a statute on its face usually are entertained only if first amendment
rights are involved. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940); cf. Comment,
The Hatch Act Reaffirmed: Demise of Overbreadth Review?, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 161
(1973).
56. Comment, Judicial Review of the Right to Travel: A Proposal, 42 Wash. L. Rev.
873, 880 (1967) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Review).
57. The dissenters thought that the passport denial was "reasonably related to the national
security." 378 U.S. at 527 (dissenting opinion). But see id. at 512-13 (opinion of the Court).
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The second, and seemingly more widely accepted, interpretation of Justice
Goldberg's majority opinion is that "First Amendment rights are related to the
right to travel in only certain specific situations, such as in the immediate case;
and thus only in such instances would travel be treated as a preferred right, and
then not on account of the infringement of travel itself but rather because some
other right had been invaded as well."58 Under this interpretation, ApIheker
really involved freedom of association,59 and so first amendment standards of
review were appropriate. If, however, the right to travel in a particular case in-
volved no first amendment rights, 0 it would receive no extra protection. On the
other hand, Justice Douglas would place every travel situation within the ambit
of the first amendment, since "[flreedom of movement is kin to the right of
assembly and to the right of association." 0' 1
The concept of an emerging substantive right to travel involving first amend-
ment considerations was short lived, for in 1961, the State Department issued a
ban on American travel to Cuba. 2 In Zemel v. Rusk, 3 the State Department
refused to validate appellant's passport to travel to Cuba as a tourist for the
purpose of informing himself as to conditions there. The statutory issues raised
by Kent and the constitutional issues of Aptheker thus merged in Zemel, which
considered whether the Secretary of State was authorized by the Passport Act of
1926 to refuse to validate passports of United States citizens for travel to Cuba,
and whether the exercise of the authority was constitutionally permissible.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, upheld the action of the State
Department. The Court held that the language of the Passport Act "is surely
broad enough to authorize area restrictions."0 4 Kent, which prohibited passport
denials because of an individual's beliefs, was distinguishable, for the Zemel re-
striction involved "foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens." 65 This
distinction aside, it is clear that Zemel's broad interpretation of the Passport Act
of 1926 is inconsistent with the narrow construction applied in Kent, for the
Court there stated that "[w] here activities... such as travel, are involved, we
will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.",6 It is
difficult to see how-in the vague language of the Passport Act of 1926, 7 and
58. Turner 182.
59. Cf. 378 U.S. at 517.
60. Travel for health, for business, or for pleasure have been suggested to be concepts
which are "not ideological." Comment, Executive Restriction on Travel: The Passport Cases, S
Houston L. Rev. 499, 506 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Passport Cases].
61. 378 U.S. at 520 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black also concurred in the result,
but disagreed that the "liberty to travel abroad at will" was protected by due process. Id. at
518 (Black1, J., concurring).
62. 26 Fed. Reg. 492 (1961).
63. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. at 13.
66. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
67. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1970). The Secretary is not expressly authorized to deny pass-
ports. Passport Cases 508.
19741
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by the narrow construction given that Act by Kentl 8-area restrictions are author-
ized and class restrictions are not. Moreover, the Zemel Court cautioned that,
"simply because a statute deals with foreign relations," it may not "grant the
Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice."0 9 Yet the automatic exemp-
tions from travel bans given to certain classes of individuals, 70 do in fact confer
a "totally unrestricted freedom of choice."
As inconsistent as Zemel is with Kent on the statutory level, it seems even
more inconsistent with Aptheker on the constitutional level. The Court specif-
ically rejected Zemel's first amendment claim and distinguished Kent and
Aptheker, which concerned individual denials based on deprivation of the rights
of expression and association.71 Zemel thus supports the second interpretation of
Aptheker, i.e., that it was a first amendment decision.72 However, Zemel's right to
travel was a due process right, and controlled by the balancing test of the fifth
amendment. 73 The Court, noting that the Cuban missile crisis had preceded the
filing of Zemel's complaint by less than two months, 74 found the restriction on
travel to Cuba to be supported by "the weightiest considerations of national
security."7 5
It is arguable that Zemel is limited to the validation of the particular area
restriction imposed on Cuba in the circumstances of the time, and that the de-
cision does not uphold the constitutionality of area restrictions in general.70 But
it must be admitted that an area restriction-which applies to all travelers 7 7-
lacks the inherent arbitrariness of a class restriction, which is based on an individ-
ual's beliefs and associations. 78 Indeed, Zemel may have added content to the con-
stitutional right to travel abroad. In emphasizing that area restrictions aie valid if
they are not made on the basis of the character of the individual applicant, as
68. 357 U.S. at 127-29. See 381 U.S. at 30 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
69. 381 U.S. at 17.
70. The travel to restricted areas by reporters, doctors and scientists, certain scholars,
and representatives of the American Red Cross, will automatically be considered in the
"national interest of the United States," and is thus exempt from travel restrictions. 22 C.F.R.
§ 51.73(b) (1973).
71. 381 U.S. at 16.
72. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
73. 381 U.S. at 14-16.
74. Id. at 16.
75. Id.
76. "Travel restrictions fall logically into one of two categories: class restrictions, which
deny passports to particular classes of persons; and area restrictions, which deny passports
for travel to certain areas of the world. The restrictions imposed in both Kent and Aptheker
were class restrictions-they forbade Communists or those associated with the Communist
Party from obtaining passports. The restriction imposed in Zemel was an area restriction-it
forbade all citizens from traveling to Cuba." Judicial Review 882.
77. But see note 70 supra.
78. Justice Douglas rejected this distinction between Zemel and Aptheker, for, to him,
Zemel's right to visit Cuba was "peripheral to the enjoyment of First Amendment guarantees
.. " 381 U.S. at 25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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are class restrictions, Zemel appears to have expanded Aptheker (which applied
solely to section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act), so that "as a prac-
tical matter.. . class restrictions could never be constitutionally supported."7'
Zemel's result may well be defended as a product of the "political and social
sensitivity of the Court,"80 and of the deference shown the Executive in the
area of foreign policy.8' Its method, however, "implies an ad hoc approach to
passport restrictions, making each case largely dependent upon its factual setting
and thus further curtailing adequate constitutional predictability. ' s -' The Zemel
decision gives the right to travel abroad an uncertain status, which would seem,
necessarily, to precipitate litigation each time a new limitation on the right is
imposed.
Litigation involving the area restriction on Cuba again reached the Supreme
Court in United States v. Laub,8s in which the petitioner was indicted for con-
spiracy to violate § 215 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality ActS4 by arranging
for a group of citizens, all of whom possessed valid passports, to travel to Cuba.
As it had in Kent, the Court decided the case solely on the statutory level and
concluded that, while the Passport Act of 1926 authorized area restrictions, vio-
lation of the travel ban did not trigger criminal sanctions.8 , The criminal pro-
visions of the Act penalized only departures from the United States without a
valid passport, and a valid passport was not rendered invalid by State Depart-
ment disapproval of travel to the particular destination."0 The petitioner, there-
fore, was indicated for "conspiracy to violate a nonexistent criminal prohibi-
tion."87 The State Department then turned to administrative sanctions: it
threatened passport revocation and non-renewal, until it was assured that the
individual would not travel in the future in violation of any restriction. 8s This
practice was declared invalid in Lynd v. Rusk,80 and shortly thereafter, in 1968,
the State Department eliminated all sanctions for violations of its area re-
strictionsP9
Both Laub and Lynd were decided on the statutory level; the constitutionality
of the restrictions was not consideredY1 The two cases indicate that, absent ex-
79. Judicial Review 900.
80. Id. at 896.
81. See 1966 Duke L.J. 233, 242-43.
82. Id.
83. 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1970).
85. 385 U.S. at 487.
86. Id. at 480-81.
87. Id. at 487.
88. 31 Fed. Reg. 13,544 (1966).
89. 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
90. 33 Fed. Reg. 5681 (1968).
91. Another opportunity to review Zemel in a "noncrisis" factual setting was lost when
Bobby Fischer, who had been refused passport validation to compete in Cuba in 1965, ac-
quiesced and competed via telegraph. Note, Travel and the First Amendment: Zemel v. Rusk,
13 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 470, 481 (1966).
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plicit congressional approval of sanctions, the State Department can impose area
restrictions, but cannot enforce them.
These restrictions are, in effect, unenforceable warnings to the traveler that
the State Department disapproves his travel. Unfortunately, the very travelers
whom the State Department would most like to restrain-those whose travel
would be inimical to the interests of the nation-are the ones most likely to avail
themselves of the absence of sanctions. On the other hand, "the restrictions do
limit the movement of the great number of travelers who either respect the gov-
ernment judgment embodied in the restriction or who are confused or uninformed
about the absence of sanctions."9 2 Furthermore, the sanctionless status of area
restrictions may present a standing problem to one seeking to re-challenge their
constitutional validity in the courtsY3
This sanctionless status, however, appears likely to change. The ninety-third
Congress has been presented six different bills which would authorize the impo-
sition of sanctions for the violation of restrictions on travel by Americans to
hostile areas. 94 These bills would confer on the State Department a broad mea-
sure of control,95 and authorize stringent penalities.90 The House Committee on
Internal Security has reported favorably on one of the bills, H.R. 8023.97 In
considering this proposed legislation, Congress should re-examine the policy jus-
tifications for area restrictions.
The first policy sought to be implemented by area restrictions is the "safe-
passage" theory of area restrictions, i.e., the concern for the safety of the indi-
vidual traveling to such areas. The protection of travelers, which is insured by
blanket prohibitions on travel to "unsafe" areas, has been the chief argument
advanced by the government in support of restrictions, 98 and is the chief argu-
ment advanced in support of the new legislation which would impose new sanc-
tions.99 The argument is buttressed by the statutory duty of the President to
92. Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1144 (1972) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Security Interest).
93. Id. at 1149-S0.
94. Hearings on Restraints on Travel to Hostile Areas H.R. 1594 (Clean Bill H.R. 8023),
H.R. 278, H.R. 297, H.R. 2691, H.R. 3999, H.R. 6047 Before the House Comm. on Internal
Security, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings). The subject is before
Congress partly as a result of the emotion generated by the trips to wartime North Vietnam
of such controversial figures as David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, and Jane Fonda,
and partly due to the efforts of the Justice Department since 1967 to secure such legislation.
Id. at 16, 58.
95. H.R. 7060, the administration's proposed bill, would authorize the Secretary of State
to restrict travel by United States citizens and nationals if he determines, for example, that
the area is "[o]ne to which travel would impair U.S. foreign policy." Hearings 58.
96. For example, H.R. 1594 would punish violators by a $10,000 fine, and/or up to 10
years' imprisonment. Hearings 1-2.
97. House Comm. on Internal Security, Restraints on Travel to Countries or Areas En-
gaged in Armed Conflict with the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 93-248, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
16-17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Report].
98. E.g., United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 484 (1967).
99. "We believe that, in order to protect United States citizens in situations other than
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"use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and
proper" 0 0 to secure the release of American citizens unjustly imprisoned in for-
eign countries. The Supreme Court, however, pointed out in Apthcker that, in
reviewing travel restrictions, "it is also important to consider that Congress has
within its power 'less drastic' means of achieving the congressional objective of
safeguarding our national security."""° It has been contended that the President's
statutory duty to protect Americans abroad may be achieved by a simple warn-
ing to travelers of the dangers involved in travel to certain areas.102 A warning,
in the nature of advice rather than a blanket restriction, seemingly would fulfill
the highly discretionary wording of the statutory duty of protection, while at the
same time leave unhindered the right of those Americans who wished to assume
the risks attendant to such travel. Any possible conflict with the statutory duty
of protection could be alleviated by simple amendment to that statute providing
for this warning in lieu of protection."'
3
The "safe-passage" theory would, however, justify an area restriction imposed
to prevent the spread of contagion, since the "safety" of American travelers can
include their health. In the instance of disease, a warning to travelers would not
suffice because the interests of those persons the traveler might infect must be
considered. For the same reason, inoculation and quarantine would not be a
"less drastic," though equally viable alternative, 0 4 for similar measures would
have to be applied to those returning Americans the traveler came into contact
with outside the restricted area.1 5 This type of area restriction is not currently
authorized, 10 6 but would be a legitimate, though limited, "safe-passage" restric-
tion. 0 7
The second, and perhaps least persuasive, policy aim behind area restrictions
is the avoidance of the possible embarrassment caused by American citizens
abroad to their government. "Americans abroad can 'embarrass' the United
States in many ways, ranging from assassinating foreign leaders to vociferously
those in which our own Armed Forces are engaged, it should be possible to restrict travel
into or through areas which are at war, or in which there is armed insurrection, or into which
travel would be contrary to our national interest on foreign policy grounds." Report 19 (view
of the State Department).
100. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970). The Zemel Court saw in this statutory duty a justification
for the Secretary's conclusion that travel to Cuba by American citizens might involve the
United States in "dangerous international incidents," since "in the early days of the Castro
regime, United States citizens were arrested and imprisoned without charges." Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965).
101. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 900, 512-13 (1964) (footnote omitted).
102. Passport Cases, supra note 60, at 511.
103. Another possible means of avoiding possible conflict with the statutory duty of pro-
tection would be to create a second type of "no protection" passport. Cf. Gould, The Right
to Travel and National Security, 1961 Wash. U.L.Q. 334, 364.
104. Passport Cases 511.
105. Security Interest 1144-45 n.50.
106. 22 C.F.R. § 51.72 (1973), sets forth the criteria utilized in the present area restriction
system.
107. Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 25 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1974]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
denouncing an ally's domestic policy."' 0 8 The flaw in this argument is that there
is no guarantee that Americans who commit embarrassing acts while abroad will
do so only in the few countries under the travel bans-presently Cuba, North
Korea, and North Vietnam-and will remain on their best behavior while else-
where. 0 9
The third policy aim is the avoidance of the propaganda and bargaining ad-
vantages which may result from the visits of certain Americans to certain na-
tions. The House Committee on Internal Security was persuaded by the testimony
of experts in psychological warfare, and of returned prisoners of war, that the
appearance of American delegations in Hanoi "served to lower the morale of
our servicemen," and advance "the enemy's interest at the expense of our
own. '" 0 While there is certainly validity to the position that the physical pres-
ence in foreign countries of certain opponents of this country's policies may
demonstrate solidarity with the enemy, most of the bad propaganda effects could
be accomplished without ever leaving the United States. It is again questionable
whether this fear of harmful propoganda can justify the drastic, wholesale pro-
hibition of travel, since "the most egregious instances of giving 'aid and comfort'
to the enemy may be punishable as treason. And even in less extreme instances,
area restrictions are a crude method of preventing such conduct, since they serve
to deter the travel of many Americans who would not engage in the offending
activity.""'
The most persuasive policy asserted in defense of area restrictions is the em-
bargo theory, which utilizes area restrictions as "a tool of foreign policy similar
to an embargo on the shipment of arms or materials critical for war."" 2 Restric-
tions may be useful in curtailing aggression, preventing United States involve-
ment, or simply to punish foreign countries by cutting off their access to United
States tourism. The Supreme Court alluded to the value of area restrictions as a
tool of foreign policy in Zemel v. Rusk:
Cuba is the only area in the Western Hemisphere controlled by a Communist govern-
ment. It is, moreover, the judgment of the State Department that a major goal of the
Castro regime is to export its Communist revolution to the rest of Latin America. The
United States and other members of the Organization of American States have
determined that travel between Cuba and the other countries of the Western Hemis-
108. Security Interest 1145.
109. Id. at 1146.
110. Report 4. The Committee stated that there has "developed a vast body of informa-
tion which reveals that a substantial number of United States citizens have traveled abroad to
hostile areas and have there engaged in a variety of activities which necessarily give aid and
encouragement to the enemy and have in a variety of ways caused direct injury to our fighting
men, including the torturing of prisoners of war. Moreover it is not unreasonable to say that
our citizens by such conduct have actually prolonged the war with its attendant pain, suffer-
ing, and waste." Id. at 3.
111. Security Interest 1147 (footnote omitted).
112. Report 2.
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phere is an important element in the spreading of subversion, and many have therefore
undertaken measures to discourage such travel.113
While there is little doubt that in the instance of Cuba the area restriction has
proved a useful tool of foreign policy both as a bargaining lever and as a form
of economic pressure, it is arguable that similar results, to some degree, could
have been accomplished by less drastic methods. "Denying or withdrawing diplo-
matic recognition can serve as a means of expressing moral disapproval, as well
as a bargaining tool in negotiations. Government statements discouraging travel
to a specific country will, to some degree, discourage tourism."' 14
Should Congress authorize the imposition of sanctions, new travel litigation
will surely result, the outcome of which will depend on the particular constitu-
tional approach chosen by the courts. The balancing test of Zemel has been
applied in two recent district court cases.
In Woodward v. Rogers,115 the loyalty oath required of all applicants for
passports was held a violation of the fifth amendment's protection of the right
to travel abroad. Balancing the national interest against the liberty restricted,
the court found that the loyalty oath was an unnecessary exercise of power. Ap-
plying a strict construction to the Passport Act of 1926, as was done in Kent v.
Dudles,1 6 the court stated that no authority could be implied under the language
of the Act to authorize the oath. The court pointed out that only in the one in-
stance of Zemel v. Rusk did the Supreme Court read the statute to imply au-
thority in the executive to do anything other than formulate procedural rules1 T
In balancing the interests, the court concluded that the loyalty oath was not
"reasonably justified" by any governmental need to inform citizens of their legal
duties to the United States."18
In Berrigan v. Sigler,"19 the same district court held that the refusal of the
Parole Board to allow the plaintiffs, Philip and Daniel Berrigan,lm to travel to
North Vietnam during the ceasefire was not an arbitrary exercise of discretion,
since the Board's action had a rational relationship to its administrative respon-
sibility of protecting the public interestj'' It is clear that the court likened the
situation more to Zemel than to Kent or Aptheker, when it stated that the action
was reasonable because the Parole Board was adhering to a policy-which ap-
plied to all parolees--of prohibiting travel to certain parts of the world. It was
an "administrative action [based] on broad policy considerations without refer-
113. 381 U.S. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted).
114. Security Interest 1148.
115. 344 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1972).
116. See text accompanying notes 35-42 & 66 supra.
117. 344 F. Supp. at 985-86.
118. Id. at 988.
119. 358 F. Supp. 130 (D.D.C. 1973), afPd, No. 73-1563 (D.C. Cir., May 1, 1974).
120. The court emphasized plaintiffs' status as parolees. "[I]t is generally accepted that the
parolee's freedom is much more circumscribed than the average citizen who is not serving a
sentence for a criminal offense." Id. at 134.
121. Id. at 141.
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ence to any characteristic peculiar to plaintiffs."'1 22 In reaching its decision, the
court applied both the test of Zemel in balancing the national interest and the
liberty restricted, and the test of substantive due process set out earlier in
Skachtman v. Dulles.123 The court did not review the Parole Board's policy on
its face, as was done in Aptheker, but stated that "[ihe appropriate test of
substantive due process is whether a government regulation or restriction is
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious under the circumstances of a particular
case.' 124 Since the plaintiffs had been convicted for criminal activity related to
their protest against this country's Southeast Asia policy, the court in applying
the tests concluded that it was "not a totally unreasonable proposition" that
their presence in North Vietnam might be inimical to the interests of the United
States. 2 5
An alternative approach is to place the right to travel abroad expressly within
the protection of the first amendment. The Berrigan court, in rejecting plaintiffs'
first amendment claims, stated that "no controlling legal authority has ever held
that the right to travel abroad is a right explicitly protected under the First
Amendment."'126 On appeal, the applicability of the first amendment was denied
explicitly. 127 Yet, the contention that "[f]reedom of movement is kin to the right
of assembly and to the right of association,"' 28 is not without authority in the
Supreme Court,2 9 or among the commentators. 130 This result would, however,
produce "a strained interpretation which violates the letter and spirit of the [first]
amendment,"' 3 ' and is in fact unnecessary to insure the foreign traveler a high
degree of protection.
It is submitted that the method of facial review outlined by the first inter-
pretation of Aptheker, 32 would achieve a first amendment standard of review,
while retaining the right to travel as an interest in liberty protected by the fifth
amendment due process clause. 13 3 Such an approach would avoid tipping the
122. Id. at 140.
123. See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
124. 358 F. Supp. at 138.
125. Id. at 141.
126. Id. at 137.
127. Berrigan v. Sigler, No. 73-1563, at 10 (D.C. Cir., May 1, 1974).
128. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
129. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 25 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
130. "If the right to travel is 'an attribute of personal liberty' or a 'natural right,' It Is as
deserving of protection as freedom of speech." Boudin, supra note 6, at 58. See Hearings,
supra note 94, at 37 (statement of Ramsey Clark); Velvel, Geographical Restrictions on
Travel: The Real World and the First Amendment, 15 U. Kan. L. Rev. 35 (1966); Note,
Travel and the First Amendment: Zemel v. Rusk, 13 U.C.LAL. Rev. 470 (1966). But see
Note, Passports and Travel: Towards a Rational Policy of Area Restriction Enforcement, 8
Harv. J. Legis. 518, 522 (1971).
131. Passport Cases, supra note 60, at 506. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 52-57 supra and accompanying text.
133. See 381 U.S. at 14; 378 U.S. at 505. The right of locomotion was one of the first
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scales in favor of the traditional deference shown the Executive in matters of
foreign policy and national security,134 resulting in the routine validation of
travel restrictions. A return to Aptheker is not foreclosed by Zemel,135 which
concerned the "weightiest considerations" of the Cuban missile crisis. Nor would
Aptheker, which held the right to travel abroad to be within the protection of the
due process clause, be too inflexible a standard to uphold restrictions in facts
similar to Zemel.
The suggested approach would not entirely rule out the effectiveness of area
restrictions, but it would apply a rigorous standard of review'30 to legislation
which restricts the constitutional right of Americans to travel abroad.' 7 It would
also have the effect of protecting a citizen's "right to know" which in fact
enhances the effectiveness of our foreign policy. "One of the best ways for the
American people to become informed about their foreign policy is through free
and independent examination of its operation." 38 This "right to know" is the
bottom line of the American citizen's ability and right to travel abroad. It high-
lights the chief danger in a system of travel restrictions, and a strong reason
against the adoption of any sanctions for their violation: "[ti here is a particular
danger that area restrictions will become a self-protective device for those in
power, utilized to keep the public ignorant and thereby to quiet criticism of
policy decisions."'139
Raymond C. James
and most basic meanings given to the term "liberty." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries "134.
134. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
135. It is arguable that the Zemel Court did not depart completely from Justice Gold-
berg's approach in Aptheker of looking at the statute on its face, for the Court, at least
ostensibly, did review the area restriction substantively. Id. at 14-16.
136. The Supreme Court has afforded a high standard of protection to interstate travel
by according it the status of a "fundamental right." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
638 (1969).
137. Rep. Robert F. Drinan, in examining the proposed travel legislation, discussed at
text accompanying notes 94-99 supra, has concluded that under Aptheker "[legislation spe-
cifically prohibiting the delivery of usable armaments might pass the constitutional test. But
legislation which permits the prohibition of all travel, at the whim and caprice of the Exec-
utive, upon a finding of 'armed conflict' by the Executive, cannot pass that test." Report 30
(dissenting view).
138. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Special Comm. to Sludy
Passport Procedures: Freedom to Travel 36 (1958).
139. Security Interest 1148 (footnote omitted).
